
Warning! This is an article about inauthentic content and misinformation messages!
Modern election campaigns no longer take place on the ground or in the traditional media space. A significant part of pre-election is carried out online, in a seemingly informal environment, where a like, a comment or a trending hashtag can completely distort public perception. What looks like genuine support from citizens can often turn out to be an artificial construction created and maintained by fake account networks. The manipulation is not accidental. It is a deliberate, coordinated strategy designed to control public perception.
While monitoring the election campaign, the Promo-LEX team revealed a massive network of fake TikTok accounts which distributes narratives worthy of being called fake or referred to as “inauthentic coordinated content”. The hashtag they use, #alegmoldova (meaning “I choose Moldova”), quickly climbed into the trend, gathering 1.3 million views in just 72 hours (Picture 1).
Picture 1

This growth does not reflect real popularity or genuine support. The phenomenon is backed by 25 core accounts subsequently multiplied into almost 500 additional accounts (Picture 2) which share the same videos, the same graphics and the same narrative, obsessively reiterating messages and creating the impression of a majority. What this network distributes is AI-generated content, and some accounts use a profile picture with national elements (such as people dressed in national costumes) to give an impression that the account belongs to a seemingly simple and disinterested person.
Picture 2

The accounts operate with military discipline: they obsessively post only two hashtags — #alegmoldova and #moldova, although TikTok allows users to place five hashtags. The deliberate choice of these two tags seems to have a well-defined purpose, and that is to manipulate TikTok’s algorithm to force posts into the trend. Thus, when an ordinary citizen opens the app, they are led to believe that there is a massive wave of true information supported by hundreds of thousands of people. In reality, it is a digital intoxication operation hidden behind fictitious identities. For voters, these fabricated figures become false signals of popularity and credibility.
What narratives does the revealed network of accounts promote?
Messages shared by the network of apparently fake accounts use the following narratives:
- The link between EU membership and the LGBTQ community. There are images from LGBTQ marches, accompanied by messages suggesting that such events would be a direct consequence of Moldova’s accession to the European Union. The video states that it is a goal supported by the head of state.
- Fake-based attacks on the government. Posts share a false story about an oligarch who allegedly fled to London. The material features the picture of an unknown person described as a “mentor” of the Moldovans which allegedly explains that the Russian Federation is intentionally presented as evil. At the same time, it is mentioned that “rich people do not pay taxes” and that there is “illegal transportation of household appliances”, these statements being presented as propaganda attributed to the ruling party.
- Manipulation by an AI-created TV host. Some posts use the image of a Moldovan TV host whose voice has been changed using AI. In the video, she claims that a youth movement with anti-European rhetoric is gaining popularity in Moldova. This content is hashtagged #alegmoldova and urges people to vote against the ruling party, stating that the country has become “a puppet of the West” under Maia Sandu’s leadership.
- Denigration campaign through association with a comedian. The post claims that a comedian known as a supporter of Maia Sandu “humiliates obese women” and labels him as a “pedophile”.
The methods identifying this network are obvious. The accounts display uniformity in content and post types (Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior), replicating the same videos and visual graphics, thus creating an illusion of massive popularity. Usernames follow clear, almost mechanical patterns such as “mine3”, “mine677”, “mine688”, “boot1”, “boot11” or “boot13”, indicating that these are not real users but serial manufactured identities. Most of them do not follow anyone and are not followed by anyone, which indicates that they were created artificially.
The danger of such networks for electoral competition
The danger of this network is not limited to hashtag manipulation, and these techniques are not simple campaign tricks. Instead of public opinion being formed by debates and arguments it is distorted by large amounts of inauthentic content. More seriously, such networks undermine people’s trust in the online space. When it becomes impossible to tell a genuine comment from a fabricated one, citizens begin to think everything is fake.
In conclusion, in the digital age, fake account networks have become a tool perhaps more powerful than traditional methods of sharing electoral messages. The difference is that they operate surreptitiously, invisibly, through fabricated identities, influencing not just the vote but how voters perceive reality.
Note: At the time this article was published, some of the core accounts were no longer accessible. Still, their multiplied accounts remain active, with content maintained in their profile (Picture 3).
Picture 3

While developing this article we used manual and automatic data collection and mapped the network to determine the number of accounts and views to make sure we have the most complete picture of the #alegmoldova phenomenon.
This material was prepared as part of the Election Observation Mission for the parliamentary elections of September 28, 2025. The mission is financially supported by Sweden, the UK Government, the European Union, the French Embassy and the Council of Europe under the aegis of the Civic Coalition for Free and Fair Elections.
For more information please contact
Dumitrita Ciuvaga
Spokesperson, Promo-LEX Association
Tel: +373 68 800 827

