Author: Vadim Vieru, Lawyer, Promo-LEX Association
Executive summary
The 30 November 2025 elections for the so-called Supreme Soviet of the Transnistrian region had an official turnout of 26.01% – approximately 102,600 voters out of 394,000 registered.
All 33 seats went to the Obnovlenie (Renewal) party, controlled by the Sheriff holding company[1] and businessman Viktor Gushan, consolidating a de facto one-party regime with minimal or no competition in many constituencies.
Voter turnout dynamics show a structural collapse: from 78.6% in the 2006 “pro-Russia” referendum to around 60% in the 2016 presidential elections, then below 30% in the 2020 parliamentary elections and a new low of 26% in 2025[2] .
The low turnout reflects a combination of political demoralisation, socio-economic degradation and mass migration, in a context where wages and pensions in the region are almost half those on the right bank, and the energy crises of 2025 have hit industry and households hard.
However, nothing changes at the institutional level – Sheriff continues to dominate the economy and politics, and elections remain a ritual of legitimisation rather than a mechanism for change. Instead, the external context is changing: Chișinău is advancing on the path to European integration, and the region’s economic model is becoming increasingly unsustainable[3] .
- Context: an unrecognised “state”, a well-recognised company
The Transnistrian region is a separatist territory along the Nistru River, internationally unrecognised but politically and militarily supported by Russia since the 1990s. Its “parliament”, the Supreme Soviet (now formally renamed the Supreme Council), has 33 deputies elected in single-member constituencies.
In practice, however, the real centre of power is not in the legislative building on 25 October Boulevard, but in the offices of the Sheriff holding company – a conglomerate founded in the 1990s by former security officers, including Viktor Gușan. Sheriff controls supermarket chains, telecommunications, fuel imports, football, part of the media and a large share of contracts with the regional budget[4] .
Independent assessments describe Sheriff as an actor that has a near monopoly on profitable sectors and directly influences appointments to key positions in the regime. The so-called president Vadim Krasnoselski and the absolute majority in the Supreme Soviet are aligned with the interests of this economic group.
Recent analyses even speak of the existence of two main “clans”: the business elite grouped around Gușan and Sheriff; and the security structures closer to Moscow (around figures such as Foreign Minister Vitali Ignatiev).
The model works as long as there are cheap resources (especially free Russian gas) and a minimum of political stability. After 2022, and especially after the cessation of gas transit through Ukraine in early 2025, this model entered into an open crisis.
- Participation dynamics: from 78% to 26% in less than two decades
If we look only at the snapshot, 26% seems like a small number. If we place it in a historical series, it becomes a wake-up call.
The 2006 referendum on independence and “approchement” with Russia reported a turnout of about 78.6%, with over 97% voting “for” the pro-Russian course.
The 2016 presidential elections – when Krasnoselski replaced Shevchuk – had an official turnout of 60.1%, still high for an unrecognised and controlled regime[5] .
The 2020 parliamentary elections for the Supreme Soviet already marked a break: turnout of about 28%, with 29 seats going to Obnovlenie and the remaining four going to independents also connected to Sheriff.
The parliamentary elections of 30 November 2025 saw turnout fall to 26.01% – a historic low – with all 33 seats going to Obnovlenie, controlled by Sheriff. In addition, the administration does not publish detailed data on constituencies or on votes cast “against all”.
While in 2006 the regime could credibly claim that “the entire population” confirmed its political course through voting, in 2025 three out of four registered voters did not show up at the polls.
This is not just a matter of apathy, but rather a combination of factors: the actual thinning of the electorate through mass migration (a large part of the 394,000 voters exist “on paper” rather than in the territory); disappointment with the promise of social stability, in a context of repeated energy crises and declining living standards; the perception that the outcome is predetermined and that voting does not change who holds power.
It is no coincidence that local analysts such as Igor Boțan describe the situation in the region as one of “deep demoralisation”, while experts such as Gheorghe Balan speak openly about the functional “nullity” of these elections[6] .
- What 26% means in concrete terms: between demoralisation, migration and poverty
3.1. Everyday life: higher bills, lower incomes
In 2025, the Transnistrian region was hit by the most severe energy crisis in decades when Russian gas supplies were cut off. Central heating was interrupted, industry was partially shut down, and the region entered a state of prolonged economic emergency.
Gas, heating and electricity prices rose sharply – in some cases by more than 60–100% for the population – while wages and pensions remained at almost half the average on the right bank of the Nistru.
For ordinary people, this means: pensioners choosing between medicine and heating bills; workers laid off from industry or furloughed when factories such as the Rîbnița Metallurgical Plant shut down; young families calculating whether it is more advantageous to go to work in Chișinău, Iași or Berlin – with a Moldovan passport already obtained[7] .
It is no coincidence that demographic studies show a decline in population from approximately 750,000 inhabitants in 1989 to around 450,000 in 2014, with the downward trend continuing. Almost every family has someone who has left to work or study abroad[8] .
In this context, voting in an election with no real stakes becomes, for many, a very low priority.
3.2. Voting as a ritual, absence as a form of “safe protest”
The 2025 elections took place with minimal competition: in many constituencies there was only one candidate, and where there were “independents”, they were mostly directly or indirectly connected to the Sheriff network – a situation similar to that documented in 2020. In addition, the regime controls most local media institutions; space for genuine opposition is reduced through economic, administrative or security pressures; real public debate is replaced by repetitive messages about “external threats” and “stability”.
In such a context, voting does not bring tangible benefits, and open criticism can come at a cost. Therefore, for many, non-participation becomes the only form of “protest vote” with minimal risk.
It is no coincidence that Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service interpreted the 2025 elections as a sign of a “deepening rift” between the population and the occupation administration, emphasising that the discord is also spreading in relation to Moscow[9] .
- Why is nothing changing politically and institutionally?
Low turnout does not automatically translate into a crisis of the regime. The administration in the region is not a consolidated democracy in which political legitimacy depends on competitive elections and confidence ratings.
4.1. State capture: Sheriff + the security apparatus
Sheriff is not just a “local oligarch”, but the economic infrastructure of the regime – the holding company controls retail chains, fuel imports, telecommunications, football, real estate; it absorbs a significant part of budget expenditures through contracts and monopolies; it places its people in key positions in the executive and legislative branches.
On the other side are the security structures, dependent on cooperation with Russia and the maintenance of a certain military status quo (the presence of Russian troops and the Cobasna depot).
Tensions between these two centres may influence the regime’s tactics, but they do not call into question its authoritarian and captured nature.
4.2. Elections as institutional “simulation”
Elections have three main roles for the regime: 1) Simulation of state normality – the Transnistrian region can claim to have all the attributes of a “state”: constitution, parliament, president, parties, elections; 2) Recycling loyal elites – replacing worn-out figures with new ones, but equally connected to the power network; and 3) Testing administrative loyalty – mobilising local resources (mayors, state-owned enterprises, universities) to demonstrate their role in the control machinery.
As long as no internal political actor with comparable resources emerges and as long as Moscow does not decide to force a change of guard, the result will remain – Obnovlenie + Sheriff = 100% of the Supreme Soviet.
- The link with Chișinău and the European path: a window of opportunity, not a reason for euphoria
In parallel with these alleged elections with a turnout of 26%, the Republic of Moldova is advancing on its European path. In 2025, the pro-EU PAS party reconfirms its absolute majority in Parliament, against the backdrop of a clear message of European integration and reducing energy dependence on Russia. The EU and financial institutions such as the EBRD are investing heavily in Moldova’s energy security, including by diversifying electricity and gas sources and reducing the role of the Cuciurgan power plant.
Paradoxically, the region’s population is indirectly benefiting from this course of action – the EU is explicitly directing part of its energy crisis funds to households on the left bank; Chișinău is negotiating schemes to reduce the risk of a humanitarian collapse in the region, precisely in order not to fuel Russian propaganda.
At the same time, the Transnistrian region is becoming less and less attractive to Moscow as a tool of pressure – it costs a lot (historical gas debts of over $11 billion) and brings increasingly limited strategic benefits after Ukraine closed the transit corridor.
For Chișinău and its partners, the elections with a 26% turnout are a useful indicator, not a solution in themselves. They show that the internal legitimacy of the regime is weaker than official rhetoric suggests; that the population’s social dependence on Moscow is declining, while economic dependence on relations with the right bank and the EU is increasing; that there is a significant segment of the population that is practically rather than ideologically oriented – interested in wages, pensions and mobility, not Soviet symbols.
- Policy pointers
The 26% turnout is not just a statistical finding, but an input parameter for public policy.
6.1. For Chișinău
- Clear separation of the population from the regime – official communication should emphasise the distinction between citizens on the left bank and the political and economic elites who control the region. Messages such as “we are not punishing the people for their choice of leadership” can reduce anxiety and open channels for pragmatic dialogue.
- Intelligent use of “energy leverage” – recent crises show that Transnistria’s dependence on energy resources and the Moldovan market is a real lever. But its use must be accompanied by social protection mechanisms for the population (targeted subsidies, compensation schemes, energy efficiency projects), otherwise the risk of radicalisation increases.
- Expanding access to documents and services – simplifying procedures for Moldovan identity documents, recognising education, access to the labour market and medical services on the right bank are direct investments in the economic “de-identification” of the population from the regime.
- Support for independent media and civil society – in conditions of local media control, any window of alternative information – in Russian, Romanian or Ukrainian – matters. Discreet support for independent media platforms and cross-river initiatives can erode Tiraspol’s narrative monopoly.
6.2. For the EU and development partners
- Continuing the “conditionality + social safety nets” approach – energy aid for Moldova and Transnistria should be linked to concrete steps towards transparency, reform and a reduction in dependence on Russian resources, but without creating the perception of ‘collective punishment’ of the population on the left bank.
- Targeting elites, not communities – The sanctions and visa restrictions regime can be more clearly targeted at those involved in state capture (key figures in Sheriff, political leaders, security service representatives), rather than ordinary residents.
- Integrating the Transnistrian conflict into Moldova’s accession agenda – not as an impossible precondition, but as a gradual process: infrastructure projects, energy interconnections, exchange programmes, all designed as investments in future reintegration, regardless of the final legal form.
Conclusion
The 26% turnout in the Transnistrian region does not herald the collapse of the regime tomorrow, but it marks the end of an illusion: that the majority of society on the left bank of the Nistru believes in Tiraspol’s political project.
The regime continues to control the institutions, but it no longer controls the emotions and hopes of a growing part of the population – those who obtain Moldovan passports, go to work in the EU, consume online media from Chișinău and Kyiv, and treat local elections as background noise.
Ultimately, nothing has changed in terms of results – Obnovlenie and Sheriff retain total control. But the level of belief in this arrangement has changed. And for those who are thinking about medium-term policies for the Republic of Moldova, it is precisely here, in this gap between form and substance, that one of the most important windows of opportunity in the last 30 years lies.
This article was prepared by the Promo-LEX Association with the support of the Soros Foundation Moldova, the European Union and the National Endowment for Democracy. The opinions expressed in the article do not necessarily reflect the position or opinion of the Soros Foundation Moldova, the European Union or the National Endowment for Democracy.
[1] RISE Moldova. “Republic Sheriff: The investigation that reveals the real beneficiaries of the Transnistrian economy.” RISE Moldova, 2016. https://www.rise.md/articol/republica-sheriff/.
[2] Freedom House. “Transnistria: Freedom in the World 2024 Country Report.” Freedom House, 2024. https://freedomhouse.org/country/transnistria/freedom-world/2024.
[3] Foy, Henry. “The Commercialised ‘Republic’ of Transnistria.” Financial Times, 14 July 2017. https://www.ft.com.
[4] De Waal, Thomas. “Uncertain Ground: Engaging With Europe’s De Facto States and Separatist Territories.” Carnegie Europe, 3 December 2018. https://carnegieeurope.eu.
[5] ZdG Editorial Team, “Low turnout in the so-called elections in the Transnistrian region. Most “deputies” retained their seats,” Ziarul de Gardă, 1 December 2025, accessed 4 December 2025, https://www.zdg.md/stiri/prezenta-slaba-la-asa-numitul-scrutin-din-regiunea-transnistreana/
[6] IPN, “Igor Boțan: The situation in the Transnistrian region is in continuous decline,” IPN, 1 December 2025, accessed on 4 December 2025, https://ipn.md/igor-botan-situatia-din-regiunea-transnistreana-este-intr-o-continua-degradare/
[7] Eugen Urușciuc, “On the eve of the heating season, uncertainties remain in the energy sector in Transnistria,” Europa Liberă Moldova, 16 October 2025, accessed on 4 December 2025, https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/in-pragul-sezonului-de-incalzire-in-transnistria-se-mentin-incertitudinile-in-sectorul-energetic/33561600.html
[8] Lina Grâu, “Depopulation of the Transnistrian region: ‘One comes to Chișinău, 20 leave abroad’”, Europa Liberă Moldova, 23 August 2021, accessed on 4 December 2025, https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/depopularea-regiunii-transnistrene-unul-vine-la-chi%C8%99in%C4%83u-20-pleac%C4%83-peste-hotare-/31429771.html
[9] Europa Liberă Moldova, “Ukraine has announced a search for Tiraspol chief negotiator Vitali Ignatiev, suspected of supporting Russia,” Europa Liberă Moldova, 29 March 2024, accessed 4 December 2025, https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/ucraina-l-a-anuntat-in-cautare-pe-negociatorul-sef-de-la-tiraspol-vitali-igantiev-suspectat-ca-sprijina-rusia/32882889.html